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DEFENDING THE UNIQUENESS THESIS: A 
REPLY TO LUIS ROSA 
Muralidharan ANANTHARAMAN 
ABSTRACT: The Uniqueness Thesis (U), according to Richard Feldman and Roger 
White, says that for a given set of evidence E and a proposition P, only one doxastic 
attitude about P is rational given E. Luis Rosa has recently provided two 
counterexamples against U which are supposed to show that even if there is a sense in 
which choosing between two doxastic attitudes is arbitrary, both options are equally and 
maximally rational. Both counterexamples work by exploiting the idea that ‘ought 
implies can’ and trying to spell out situations in which some inferences are beyond the 
capabilities of some reasoners. I argue that on a descriptive account of doxastic 
rationality, questions of whether ‘epistemic ought implies can’ can be bracketed and that 
at least one of the inferential moves that Rosa describes in his cases is irrational. I further 
argue that a descriptive account of doxastic rationality is the appropriate notion of 
rationality that is to be considered when evaluating U. If my argument for a descriptive 
account of rationality is successful, then we have reason to revise our use of the term 
rationality to fit this descriptive understanding. 
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Introduction 
We have many beliefs, and we would like to think, for any given belief, that not 
only is it true, but also that we are justified in believing this to be the case. 
However, when we meet others who are just as rational as ourselves and who 
possess the same evidence, but take a different doxastic attitude, we may be 
concerned about what we should do, whether one or more of us should or should 
not revise our beliefs so as to be aligned with that of others’. On the one hand, it 
might seem that if rational disagreement were possible, then the fact that we have 
different beliefs given the same evidence, may not be too disquieting. Conversely, 
it would seem inappropriate to so easily dismiss the concern that perhaps one of 
the parties has indeed made a mistake while forming his beliefs. After all, the 
question may arise as to why we hold one particular belief rather than another. To 
this, the only answer which would be consistent with taking that belief to be fully 
determined by the reasons we have is that this belief is more appropriate than any 




According to the Uniqueness Thesis: 
Uniqueness Thesis (U): ‘Given a body of evidence, [at most one doxastic 
attitude1] is the rationally justified one’2  
Roger White defends U by showing that alternatives to U are untenable. 
White calls all these alternatives ‘permissive theses’ and defines them as follows. 
The first one is Extreme Permissiveness (EP):  
(EP): ‘There are possible cases in which you rationally believe P, yet it is 
consistent with your being fully rational and possessing your current 
evidence that you believe not-P instead’3 
Luis Rosa defends EP by offering a counterexample in which either P or 
not-P is allegedly permissible if the relevant evidence contains, unknown to 
oneself, inconsistent premises.4 
The second is Moderate Permissiveness, (MP) which does not sanction such 
vastly opposed doxastic attitudes, but still sanctions a narrower range of such 
attitudes.  Rosa presents one version: 
(MP): ‘There are cases in which a certain body of evidence E makes believing 
that P rational, but E could also make suspending judgment about P 
rational’5 
Rosa defends MP by offering a counterexample to U in which both 
suspending judgment and believing P are permissible, if in one case, an agent is 
incapable of making a particular inference.6 Of course, the leeway in doxastic 
attitudes sanctioned by MP may be much smaller.7  
In this paper, I will defend the Uniqueness Thesis against Rosa’s 
counterexamples,8 by appealing to a non-deontic account of rationality. I shall 
specifically defeat the counterexamples that defend some version of either EP or 
                                                                
1 To be clear, I am only concerning myself with the degree of confidence that a person can have 
with respect to a particular proposition. I do not take up whether it is permissible to use a given 
proposition as a premise in subsequent reasoning nor am I, in this paper, concerned with 
pragmatic encroachment. 
2 Richard Feldman,  “Reasonable Religious Disagreements,” in Philosophers Without Gods, ed. 
Louise M. Antony (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 205. 
3 Roger White, “Epistemic Permissiveness,” Philosophical Perspectives, 19, Epistemology (2005): 
447. 
4 Luis Rosa, “Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis,” Logos & Episteme III, 4 (2012): 572-574. 
5 Rosa, “Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis,” 572. 
6 Rosa, “Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis,” 574-575. 
7 White, “Epistemic Permissiveness,” 453. 
8 Rosa, “Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis,” 571-577. 
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MP. If no counterexample to U can be constructed, it may be because U is 
necessarily true. 
Motivating U 
By definition, if a given belief B is based on extremely permissive evidence, E, 
then one could have rationally based the opposite belief on E. White’s objection to 
EP is that if this is the case, then inferring B from E is no better than using an 
arbitrary process like taking a belief inducing pill or flipping a coin. However, if 
one’s belief is arrived at via such an arbitrary process, it is irrational. The point 
about arbitrariness is crucial as a body of evidence, as a whole, cannot be said to 
support a proposition if it does not support the proposition more than its negation. 
It could be said that MP exhibits this same arbitrariness, but only to a lesser 
degree; only that the intuitive force of the point is not as strong as with EP. 
According to Kelly,9 in cases where the permissible range of views is so narrow 
that all permissible doxastic attitudes are only minutely different from one 
another, choosing one of those attitudes over another does not seem viciously 
arbitrary. 
One way of resisting U is to show via counterexamples, that having multiple 
doxastic attitudes from E is not arbitrary. Another strategy is to show via 
counterexamples, that those multiple doxastic attitudes, even if arbitrary, are not 
irrational. That is to say, that even if reasoning from the same piece of evidence 
leads different people to different conclusions, they may still be instantiating good 
types of reasoning. The focus of this paper will be the second strategy. 
This second approach10 is to invoke certain deontic features of reasoning, 
namely the idea that ‘ought implies can,’ that are prominent in internalist 
accounts of epistemic justification.11 Implicit in this strategy is the idea to say that 
some inference is rational implies that such an inference is either obligatory or 
permissible. Since real reasoners are incapable of thinking about all of their beliefs 
at the same time, they may fail to notice inconsistent beliefs that they may hold 
even when they make a sincere attempt to verify that all their beliefs are 
consistent with one another. I will call this way of using the term ‘rational’ d-
                                                                
9 Thomas Kelly, “Can Evidence Be Permissive?” in Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, eds. 
Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, and John Turri (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013): 298-311. 
10 See Anthony Booth and Rik Peels, “Why Responsible Belief is Permissible Belief,” Analytic 
Philosophy 55, 1 (2014): 75-88 and Rosa, “Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis,” 571-577. 
11 Richard Foley, “Conceptual Diversity in Epistemology,” The Oxford Handbook of 
Epistemology, ed. Paul K Moser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 179-180 
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rational12 and contrast it with another way of using the term rational. If a given 
inference is beyond the capabilities of a reasoner, the inference is neither 
obligatory nor even permissible for that reasoner. If that is the case, then a person 
may have done the best that she was capable of, given her abilities, and still make 
different inferences from the same body of evidence due to chance or some other 
factors. For instance, limited reasoners may have to make tradeoffs between 
acquiring true beliefs and avoiding false beliefs. Different attitudes towards 
epistemic risk would make different inferences rational for different people. Since 
such a person could not have done more, she is not obligated to do more and 
cannot be called d-irrational. Since she has not failed her epistemic duties and 
even if she did have an epistemic duty, her failure to do so could not have been 
avoided; she is beyond criticism on this account. As such, both doxastic attitudes 
towards the evidence are rationally justified, though, perhaps, not simultaneously. 
Often, in such counterexamples, details about which inferences are made are not 
available. In such cases it becomes impossible to affirm or deny whether any of the 
reasoners’ inferences are rationally defective. Luis Rosa13 presents 
counterexamples which are more detailed in this respect. When the exact 
inferences made are supplied, it is possible to assess the counterexample to see if 
Rosa is indeed correct about the rationality of both reasoners. 
If d-rationality was indeed the relevant way in which proponents of U 
think there can only be one rational response to the total evidence, then U is in 
trouble. I will argue, therefore, that there cannot be more than one rational 
response. I contend that there is another, non-deontic way in which we use the 
term ‘rational’ which is appropriate in at least some situations and more 
importantly, is the relevant sense in which U is meant and in which U is true.  
One way of talking about rationality which, arguably, cannot have deontic 
connotations is when we talk about defects in a person’s reasoning.14 One of the 
counterintuitive implications about using d-rationality in such a situation is that 
                                                                
12 D-rationality as such seems to assume some significant level of doxastic voluntarism. I am, for 
the purposes of this paper, willing to grant this assumption. If this assumption seems unfounded, 
then that is one more reason to think that d-rationality is the wrong way to talk about epistemic 
rationality. Objections to U which rely on d-rationality being the right account of epistemic 
rationality will likewise be unsuccessful. 
13 Rosa, “Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis,” 571-577. 
14 See Gideon Rosen, “Nominalism, Naturalism, Epistemic Relativism,” Philosophical 
Perspectives, 15, Metaphysics (2001): 85, Booth and Peels, “Why Responsible Belief is 
Permissible Belief,” 79, and David M. Holley, “Religious Disagreements and Epistemic 
Rationality,” International Journal of the Philosophy of Religion 74 (2013): 41, for examples of 
such usage. 
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to say that some instance of reasoning is without rational defect is to ordinarily 
imply that it is perfect. Consider the example of a person, Amanda, who is unable 
to use modus tollens.15 While we may in some circumstances be unwilling to call 
her irrational when she fails to use modus tollens to arrive at what seems to us a 
fairly obvious conclusion, we would be hesitant to say that her reasoning on the 
issue lacked rational defect. Since, as according to Rosa’s description of the case, 
the inference that Amanda failed to make would have been obvious to us if we 
were in those circumstances even if it was not so to her, it seems intuitively 
obvious that her failure in this case is rationally defective. Yet, per definition, 
since she was unable to use modus tollens, she had no obligation to do so and her 
reasoning thus lacked any d-rational defect. 
In order to account for the above intuition, the term ‘rationality’ must be 
used in some other sense in which either ‘ought’ does not imply ‘can’ or in which 
it is not the case that one ought to make an inference which is rational. In order to 
bracket the question of whether ‘ought implies can’ applies to the epistemic ought, 
I will opt to use the term ‘rationality’ in the second way, namely, by taking 
rationality to not imply ‘ought’ or even ‘may.’ Then, even if ‘ought’ does imply 
‘can,’ it does not apply when I use the term rational in this second sense. For 
clarity, I will use the term ‘p-rational’ to refer to the sense in which ‘rational’ is 
used in these cases. The question of whether a given inference is obligatory or 
permissible can be evaluated separately.  
We may say that an inference is p-rational if and only if no performance 
errors are made. A person makes a performance error in reasoning about a 
proposition P if the inference she makes is invalid or if she fails to make an 
inference that would have been valid had it been made and that inference bears 
on whether P. After all, if making that valid inference would not have resulted in 
a different doxastic attitude about P there are at least some cases where it would 
be unclear if such an error was relevant or significant.16 The preceding account of 
performance errors is not necessarily complete. Moreover, it is so demanding that 
all of us can be expected to fall short of its demands most of the time. However, 
this should not surprise us. Except in particularly simple reasoning tasks we 
cannot expect to avoid entirely any performance errors in our reasoning. 
Moreover, since ‘ought implies can’ does not apply to p-rationality, the fact that it 
                                                                
15 Rosa, “Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis,” 574-575. 
16 There are also some cases where such a failure would be relevant but I need not explore those 
instances in order to make my point in this paper. See John Turri, “On the Relationship between 
Propositional and Doxastic Justification,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXX, 2 
(2010): 312-326, for an excellent discussion of some of these cases. 
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is a demanding account of rationality is not a criticism that is applicable. After all, 
demanding-ness matters only if ‘ought’ implies can. It is adequate for my purposes 
if making an invalid inference as well as the failure to make a valid inference are 
performance errors. However, how do we characterise a valid inference? For the 
purposes of this paper, it is adequate to note that modus ponens and modus tollens 
are valid inferences as is replacing a conditional (If P then Q) with the disjunction 
(not-p or Q) containing the negated antecedent. 
I will now use this account of p-rationality to demonstrate that the alleged 
counterexamples to U, provided by Rosa that attempt to show that there is more 
than one rational doxastic response to some given evidence, are unsuccessful. If it 
can be shown that one or more of those inferences are invalid, then it would 
disqualify those inferences from being rational. 
Rosa’s defence of Extreme Permissiveness (EP) 
To defend EP, Rosa uses the example of Michelle who draws conclusions from a 
body of evidence E which, unknown to her, contain inconsistent premises. 
Michelle believes about George, the following: 
1. George is tired, but willing. 
2. If George is tired he will rest or sleep. 
3. George is not willing or it is not the case that he will rest or sleep.17 
From the first and second premises, Michelle can conclude that George will 
rest and (or) sleep. From the first and third, she can conclude that he will not. 
Given Rosa’s description, it should be obvious to the reader that the three 
premises are inconsistent even if it is much less apparent to Michelle. Abstracting 
from the particular content of the beliefs in question, the case can be described in 
the following way: 
Michelle could, using some of her premises found in E, rationally infer a 
conclusion C. Michelle could also rationally infer from some other premises 
found in E that not-C.  
Since, according to Rosa, either of the inferences would be rationally 
warranted, and Michelle, by stipulation and given the circumstances, could not 
have known that E contained inconsistent premises, both C and not-C are rational 
inferences from E for Michelle. Rosa further bolsters this conclusion by appealing 
to the intuition that we would be reluctant to call Frege irrational just because he 
                                                                
17 Rosa, “Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis,” 572. 
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failed to notice the contradictions inherent in his logical axioms. By such an 
exacting standard, Rosa argues, none of us are rational.18 
This bullet is a tough one to bite, only if the appropriate sense of rational 
used is d-rational. But, if p-rationality is the appropriate notion of rationality in 
this situation, it is not so difficult to think that reasoning from inconsistent 
premises is not rational even if it was unknowingly done. However, how could 
this be the case? The permissivist may argue that even if there is still a mistake 
made in reasoning from inconsistent premises, it is not a performance error as no 
invalid inferences are made, and only a performance error can implicate the 
quality of a given inference. Consider a variant of the above situation where 
Michelle has misleading evidence E’ instead. E’ is consistent, but at least one of its 
premises, unknown to her, is wrong. There is further nothing that Michelle could 
reasonably have done to figure out that E’ contained a false premise. In this case, 
there is no sense in which Michelle is irrational when she derives C’ by applying 
modus ponens to E’. Likewise, there is no performance error when carrying out 
modus ponens even when the premises are false. Michelle might be mistaken in 
thinking that E’ was appropriate to base her reasoning on, but we cannot 
necessarily attribute any performance error on her part. After all, if E’ had been 
true, using modus ponens on E’ would necessarily have yielded a true conclusion. 
If one’s premises are inconsistent, there are valid inferences that one could 
make from one’s premises that would show that this is indeed the case. The only 
way in which one could be unaware that this is the case is if one failed to make a 
particular valid inference from one’s own premises. Even if this lapse is excusable, 
unavoidable and thus often committed by all human reasoners, it is still a 
performance error. Thus, a person makes a performance error in failing to notice 
that she has inconsistent premises.  
A permissivist may still argue that even if the failure to infer that E contains 
inconsistent premises is some sort of performance error, it is not necessarily a 
performance error that is relevant to whether C or not-C. Let me illustrate: If 
there is only one pair of inconsistent premises one of which is true, E can be made 
consistent by eliminating the one premise, A, to yield E’ or eliminating the other 
one, not-A, to yield E’’. Presumably, C can be validly inferred from E’ and not-C 
from E’’. Even if the fact that E contains inconsistent premises was inferred, since 
either A or not-A could be rejected to make the set of beliefs consistent, it seems 
that not only is either way of resolving the contradiction equally rational, 
identifying that a contradiction exists still leaves us in a position of having to 
decide between inferring C and not-C via the intermediate step of resolving the 
                                                                
18 Rosa, “Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis,” 573-574. 
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contradiction one way or the other. If identifying a contradiction necessarily 
resulted in one conclusion being identified as more rational than the alternative, 
the failure to identify the contradiction would be a relevant performance error. 
But, the permissivist could argue that this is not the case here since there is, 
according to the permissivist, no uniquely best way of resolving the contradiction. 
However, the permissivist is mistaken about this last claim. Identifying the 
existence of a contradiction is relevant because there is a uniquely rational way of 
resolving contradictions. In addition to rejecting A or not-A, there is also the 
option of suspending judgment on both premises to yield E’’’. It is the case that 
either A has more support, less support or as much support as not-A. Let us 
suppose that Michelle possesses evidence T bearing on A or not-A. If the total 
evidence T supports either A over not-A or vice versa, then one or the other is to 
be rejected yielding either E’ or E’’. Given that one of the propositions enjoys 
greater support than the other, Michelle would be making a performance error if 
she rejected the proposition which enjoys greater support. Thus, if one of the 
propositions had more support than the other, there would be only one uniquely 
best response to the evidence E.  
However, what if both A and not-A were equally well supported by T? 
Might it not be the case that rejecting either one of A or not-A was equally good? 
If rejecting A was just as good as rejecting not-A, suspending judgment about A or 
not-A would be better than rejecting either proposition. This is easily 
demonstrable once we translate the degree of support for the statement A 
provided by T as the probability that A given T, p(A|T).  
Since, per assumption, T supports A and not-A to the same extent, 
p(A|T) = p((not-A)|T) ---------------------- (1) 
Since that A and not-A cannot both be true at the same time,19 the 
probability axioms cannot be violated. Since A and not-A are mutually exclusive 
and exhaust all logical possibilities, 
p(A|T) + p((not-A)|T) = 1 -------------------(2) 
Solving for (1) and (2), 
p(A|T) = p((not-A)|T) = 0.5 
Since, according to the evidentialist, epistemic rationality just amounts to 
apportioning one’s degree of belief in a proposition to the support for that 
proposition by the evidence that one has, suspending judgment about A and not-A 
is the only response that comes closest to being proportional to the support for 
                                                                
19 For the purposes of this paper, I will exclude non-standard logics. 
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those propositions by the total evidence T. Thus, any response other than 
suspending judgment about A and not-not-A would be a performance error.  
I have thus shown that knowingly reasoning from inconsistent premises 
constitutes a performance error. EP is thus, absent a better counterexample, 
indefensible, at least when we use p-rationality. Having disarmed Rosa’s EP 
counterexample with p-rationality, I will now turn to Rosa’s counterexample 
defending MP. 
Rosa’s Defence of Moderate Permissiveness (MP) 
The argument against MP is equally strong. Rosa defends MP by appealing to the 
example of Amanda who in possible world W1, is able to infer that she did not 
press a button from the following premises via modus tollens: 
1. If Amanda presses the button, her computer will get infected with a 
virus. 
2. Amanda’s computer is not infected with a virus. 
Amanda has a counterpart in possible world W2 who is incapable of 
carrying out modus tollens and thus suspends judgment about whether she pressed 
the button. Moreover, since she does not believe she has good reason to believe 
that she pressed the button, according to Rosa, it would be absurd to say that she is 
irrational in suspending judgment about whether she pressed the button. Thus, if 
Rosa is right, both believing and suspending judgment about whether she pressed 
a button are fully rational responses to E in at least this case.20 
However, the same criticism that was levelled against the EP case can also 
be levelled against the MP case. It may be that Amanda2 is not required to use 
modus tollens if she cannot and if she sees no reason to. Or even if she is required 
to, perhaps she is blameless because she lacks the capacity to do so. Yet, it is 
obvious that Amanda2’s inability to use modus tollens means that she is pre-
disposed to fail to make many valid inferences from her premises. This would 
constitute a performance error on Amanda2’s part and she would not be p-rational. 
In fact, it is hard to say that Amanda2 possesses even a normal reasoning ability let 
alone a particularly good one. The only way out for Rosa here is if it were 
somehow the case that modus tollens was not valid in W2 but valid in W1. But 
this seems implausible. In both W1 and W2, using modus tollens on true premises 
necessarily gives us true conclusions. This means that modus tollens has to be 
valid in both worlds.  
                                                                
20 Rosa, “Justification and the Uniqueness Thesis,” 574-575. 
Muralidharan Anantharaman 
138 
It thus seems to be the case that Rosa’s defence of MP is unsuccessful. If no 
better counterexample is available, MP is indefensible. Nevertheless, there might 
be other counter-examples to U that are even more refined than Rosa’s. These 
counterexamples would have to unambiguously show instances where more than 
one conclusion can be inferred from a given body of evidence and that both 
inferences are impeccable.  
Conclusion 
The above discussion has rebutted counterexamples aiming to establish that even 
if two doxastic responses to some evidence are arbitrary, they can still be rational. 
In order to establish U, I need to rebut counterexamples that purport to show that 
sometimes, multiple responses to some given evidence are non-arbitrary. Even if I 
end up showing that U is true given p-rationality, the permissivist might still 
claim that using the word rationality to mean p-rationality is only appropriate in 
some circumstances and d-rationality fits better with the way we speak. Even if as 
a descriptive matter, this was true; there might be some reasons to revise the way 
we use the word rational to refer to p-rational instead. For one, anything we can 
say in terms of d-rationality can be said in terms of p-rationality. Since d-
rationality refers to what inferences we are obligated or permitted to make, the set 
of d-rational inferences can be cashed out in terms of the set of inferences that 
most closely resemble p-rational inferences and which the reasoners in question 
are capable of making.  
On the other hand, there are some things that can be expressed in terms of 
p-rationality which cannot be expressed in terms of d-rationality. Suppose there 
are a set of inferences all of which are beyond the capabilities of a given agent, 
some of which contain fewer performance errors than others. For instance, 
suppose a large set, S, of statements exists such that some of them contradict one 
another. S also contains an indicative conditional C for which the consequent is 
also contained in S. Because S is very large, John, an ordinary but competent 
reasoner would not be able to identify that S contains inconsistent premises. It is 
also the case that because S is very large, John would not be able to affirm the 
consequent with respect to C. Since both inferences are beyond John’s capabilities, 
it is not d-rational to make either inference. Thus, if d-rationality is the concept 
that is referred to by doxastic rationality, both inferences are on par. However, if 
p-rationality is the relevant notion of rationality, identifying a contradiction is 
clearly superior to affirming the consequent. 
Thus p-rationality cannot be cashed out in terms of d-rationality. This 
asymmetry means that using rationality to refer to p-rationality is more conducive 
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to analytic clarity. This also means that it is in terms of p-rationality that the 
Uniqueness Thesis should be evaluated. Evaluating decision procedures for 
instances of peer-disagreement would be derivative of this. 
A second reason to think that p-rationality is the right way to use 
rationality in this instance is that p-rationality connects up more directly with the 
motivating intuition behind the Uniqueness Thesis. If all I am concerned about is 
whether I have violated my epistemic duties in some blameworthy manner, then 
meeting an epistemic peer who shares my evidence but who still disagrees with 
me is not necessarily troubling. Having done all I reasonably could have been 
expected to do in order to ensure that my beliefs are true, I would have no further 
epistemic duties. However, if I am concerned with acquiring true beliefs and 
avoiding false beliefs, then the presence of someone who is my epistemic peer and 
who shares my evidence, but disagrees with me is more worrying. More precisely, 
the worry is that since both beliefs cannot be true at the same time and since the 
evidence is, by assumption, true, at least one person has made a performance error 
in reasoning and that person may very well be me! If this is the case, then any 
attempt to justify epistemic permissiveness by appealing to our cognitive 
limitations is mistaken.21 
 
                                                                
21 I would like to thank Axel Gelfert, Tang Weng Hong, Chetan Cetty, Yeo Shang Long, Peter 
Kung and Luis Rosa for instructive comments on the paper. 
